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Abstract. The Lochner era has much to say about conceptions of judicial role and judicial activism, and can be 
used as an analytical example. I examine the era from the aspect of judicial reasoning. The analysis is composed of 
three main units. First, I point out a distinction between judicial and constitutional, as well as between single 
activist decisions and tendencies. Second, I sketch a theoretical framework that concerns the inclusion of social 
sciences into judicial reasoning. “Social scientifi c passivistic” reasoning features references to exact data from 
social sciences, and tends to uphold the legislative action in question. On the other hand, “social scientifi c 
activistic” reasoning refers to social scientifi c data and aims to strike down the legislative action in question. In a 
similar vein, “dogmatic activistic” reasoning is grounded on precedents and methods of legal interpretation, 
tending to strike down a legislative act, while “dogmatic passivistic” reasoning aims at upholding such an act. 
These categories are not mutually exclusive; however, they help to analyze constitutional decisions with directing 
attention to their nature behind their prima facie content. Finally, I apply the scheme to the Supreme Court’s 
Lochner era constitutional adjudication.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Since the second half of the 20th century, judicial activism has become a heated topic, which 
may be considered as a natural outcome of the inherently political relevance of the issue. 
Although the problem already led to clashes between the legislature and the judiciary in the 
fi rst decades of the 20th century – culminating in the scandal of the famous “court-packing 
plan” – it became most acute during and after the 1950s and 1960s, when the United States 
Supreme Court struck down a series of regulations affecting civil rights, thus revolutionizing 
a range of issues in constitutional law. “Judicial activism” came to be used as a sharp 
criticism against this tendency, referring mostly to the counter-majoritarian character of the 
Court’s practice. For decades, this indicated little more than the dissatisfaction of the critic 
with the direction of one Supreme Court decision or another. It was only around the 1980s 
that a detached and theoretical treatment of the problem of judicial activism began to take 
place. My paper is intended to contribute to this debate.
This article consists of four main units. In Section 2, I explain two preliminary 
distinctions. In Section 3, I refl ect upon the most important theoretical statements on, and 
characterizations of, judicial activism. In Section 4, I expound my own views. The core of 
this part does not focus primarily on a new defi nition of judicial activism (although naturally 
I do explain what characteristics of judicial practice constitute activism in my opinion), 
rather, I offer a categorization based on the existence or lack of references to scientifi c 
treatises in a judicial opinion. Finally, in Section 5, I briefl y apply my scheme to a series of 
decisions handed down between the 1890s and 1937 by the so-called “laissez-faire Court”.
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2. PRELIMINARY DISTINCTIONS IN THE ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM
Before coming to the central topic of the article, I would like to point out two distinctions 
that arise when one is dealing with the “activism” of a court.
2.1. Judicial and constitutional activism
The title of the article contains the expression “judicial”. Although it is obviously “activism” 
that is emphasized here, its possible epithets, “judicial”1 and “constitutional”2 also deserve 
attention, because they have different meanings.
In contemporary legal scholarship, activism became inseparably connected with 
constitutional review of legislative acts. In the United States, constitutional adjudication is 
decentralized, belonging to the jurisdiction of ordinary courts. In Europe, it is centralized: it 
is practiced by a specialized body that is institutionally distinguished from the ordinary 
judicial system. In the latter case, the expression “judicial activism” includes a qualifi cation 
of the activity of ordinary courts as well, irrespective of whether they take constitutional 
provisions into consideration during legal interpretation.3
It also deserves mentioning that if one associates the term “activism” with “illegitimate 
transgression of judicial authority”, decisions that apply broad legal interpretation, have 
long-term effects, and restrict the working of another branch of power, can also be 
categorized as “activist”.
“Constitutional activism” is a narrower term, which is related to the object, not the 
subject of activism. A constitution sets up the foundations of society, determines the 
relationship of the state and society, defi nes and secures fundamental rights, equal protection 
of the laws, and regulates the structure and functioning of the organization of the state.4 In 
modern legal systems these rights also establish constitutional claims on the part of an 
injured party who wishes to have his or her injuries remedied (provided he or she is affected 
by the case to a certain degree). In my opinion, there are two reasons for the fact that such 
petitions are often based on fundamental rights, and these circumstances also explain why it 
seems plausible to characterize activism as “constitutional”.
Firstly, constitutional interpretation – and specifi cally the interpretation of basic rights 
– is a fi eld where jurisprudence and “external” considerations (like those of moral 
philosophy and economy) perceptibly interweave, in other words, law becomes more 
interdisciplinary and less autonomous.5 Also, an average person identifi es more easily with 
problems related to fundamental rights, than with those connected to the functioning of the 
state organization, and thus being more distantiated from everyday thought and concerns. It 
is more probable that the average person turns to a court deciding constitutional issues 
because he or she feels that, for instance, a certain provision of a certain act discriminates 
1  See most of the United States articles and books dealing with this subject.
2  This is more characteristic of European studies, see eg Renata Uitz, ‘Constitutional Activism 
and Deference through Judicial Reasoning: Confi rming an Indeterminacy Thesis’ (Juridica 
International, VII, 2002) < http://juridicainternational.eu/index.php?id=12577 > accessed 5 February 
2015; Laurent Scheek, ‘Constitutional Activism and Fundamental Rights in Europe: Common 
Interests through Transnational Socialisation’ < http://polilexes.com/POLILEXES/textesdirects_fi les/
constitutional_activism.pdf > accessed 5 February 2015
3  Pokol (2006) 73.
4  This is a verbatim translation of the defi nition in Takács (2010) 23.
5  As to the general tendency, see Posner (1987) 761.
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against him or her unconstitutionally among other similarly situated persons, or because it 
restricts his or her religious freedom unconstitutionally, than because it impairs the principle 
of the separation of powers or the distinction of state and federal jurisdiction.
Secondly – though not independently of the above stated – fundamental rights are 
abstract enough to be related to a great variety of legal disputes by petitioners. It does not 
take a top lawyer to deduce the opposition of a legal provision to the right to human dignity, 
the prohibition of discrimination, or the right to due process. In Hungary – and probably in 
most European countries – the right to human dignity and the prohibition of discrimination 
are recurring elements of petitions presented to the Constitutional Court.6 In the United 
States, many petitions are entirely or partially grounded on the infringement of the freedom 
of speech, the impermissibility of the denial of life, liberty, and property without due 
process of law, and the equal protection of the laws.7 Affected petitioners thus resort to 
possibilities provided by fundamental rights rather than to provisions regulating questions 
of, say, state organization.
2.2. Unique decisions and judicial trends
It is one thing to label a specifi c decision activist, and it is quite another to say that a court 
is activist in a given period, that is, on certain issues, its adjudication systematically shows 
traits that are indicative of activism one way or another. Focusing on certain specifi c 
decisions in themselves obscures the broader connections that pertain to the phenomenon of 
activism. For instance, such an attitude does not help at all to reveal the long-term effects of 
the decision or the frequency of decisions with a similar outcome or similar reasoning. On 
the other hand, paying attention only to broader trends may provide a false view by 
emphasizing only the quantitative aspects of the activism problem, for example, by showing 
only the statistical proportion of decisions striking down legislative acts, but without 
delving deeply into the argumentative features that appear in such decisions. These two 
approaches are, of course, necessarily connected, and are not mutually exclusive; what is 
more, it is highly benefi cial that a researcher takes both of them into consideration, but 
nevertheless, I consider this analytical separation necessary, because it gains signifi cance in 
discussing certain attempts at defi ning activism.8
3. APPROACHES TO THE DEFINITION OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM
In this section, I am going to introduce three approaches to judicial activism. These are not 
necessarily original attempts at defi nition, rather, some of them are overviews of the implicit 
or explicit conceptions most commonly expressed.
6  In Hungary, from January 1st, 2012, the right to human dignity is provided by Article II, the 
prohibition of discrimination is declared by Article XV of the Fundamental Law of Hungary 
(Magyarország Alaptörvénye). Before the Fundamental Law was enacted, the formerly effective Act 
XX of 1949 of the Constitution (az Alkotmányról szóló 1949. évi XX. törvény) provided these 
fundamental rights in Paragraphs 54 and 70/A.
7  Freedom of speech is provided by the First, the right to due process is guaranteed by the Fifth 
and Fourteenth (federal and state level), and the equal protection of the laws is provided by the 
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.
8  Cf. e.g. 3.2.2.
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3.1. Wolfe and the development of judicial review
One of the most acknowledged authors who systematically discussed the problematics of 
judicial activism is Christopher Wolfe, whose defi nition of activism can be summarized in 
connection with the historical development of judicial review. Wolfe distinguishes between 
three forms of judicial review that appeared historically in succession. The fi rst one, 
traditional judicial review, lasted from the birth of the United States to the end of the 19th 
century. This approach to constitutional interpretation is characterized by the conviction 
that the basic norm of the legal system is a coherent whole with a clearly identifi able 
meaning, and this meaning can be determined solely by the text and the possible intention 
of the framers. The former was the primary source of the meaning of the Constitution, 
while the latter was counted as a supplementary instrument in case of the insuffi ciency of 
the text. Besides, courts treated the Constitution – partly because of its written character, 
partly because of its crucial role as a source of law – as a directly applicable law, the 
primacy of which differs in no way from that of, say, a statute with respect to executive 
orders.9
Around the framing of the Constitution it was still debated whether judicial review had 
a right to exist. In the end, supporters of its legitimacy came out victorious, but its 
application turned out to be quite restricted. In this era, the Supreme Court typically 
refrained from striking down laws, as is traceable in McCulloch v Maryland, where Chief 
Justice Marshall declared that “it is a constitution we are expounding”.10 In this oft-cited 
sentence he indicated that a constitution should be interpreted restrictively, because such 
practice warrants that the legislature is not hampered in adequately solving the ever-
changing problems of society.11
Traditional judicial review was followed by the transitional one, which was dated by 
Wolfe to the beginning of the 20th century, thus essentially identifi ed with the “conservative 
activism” of the Supreme Court. This can be related to the ratifi cation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and a change in the interpretation of certain of its provisions. This Amendment, 
prescribing for the states the requirement of due process and the equal protection of the 
laws, and protecting the “privileges and immunities” of United States citizens, was 
originally aimed at the protection of certain rights of newly freed slaves,12 however, its 
general wording made it possible for its provisions to be applied in debates not directly 
related to the emancipation of freedmen, and these regulations, especially the Due Process 
Clause, became instruments of the protection of substantive legal rights. This change in 
interpretation made it possible for the Supreme Court to strike down certain laws – mostly 
state laws – based on the right to “liberty” – in this respect, mostly liberty of contract – and 
property. This judicial attitude rooted in an idea presupposing the existence of a certain 
“natural justice”,13 and the assailed regulation was measured to this justice.14
  9  Wolfe (1986) 41–51.
10  “[I]t is a constitution we are expounding.” 17 US (4 Wheat.) 407.
11  This is emphasized by Scalia (1989) 852–853.
12  Wolfe (1986) 125.
13  Wolfe (1986) 147.
14  Scholars mostly agree that one of the foundations of the American Constitution was the idea 
of classic natural law – the assumption of certain inalienable rights. This inspired the framers to ratify 
the Bill of Rights as well, the necessity of which was, by the way, hotly debated. The way of enforcing 
natural law is also a matter of debate. On the one hand, the written Constitution and its catalogue of 
rights are the results of the idea of natural law, because principles of moral philosophy became part of 
Ajur2.indb   216 2015.09.25.   13:30:25
217DOGMATIC AND SOCIAL SCIENTIFIC ACTIVISM IN THE LOCHNER ERA
The third type of judicial review in Wolfe’s typology of modern judicial review 
according to him is a product of the Supreme Court’s extension of fundamental rights in the 
1950s. The main characteristic of this era is the lore of the “living Constitution”, the notion 
that the abstract regulations of a constitution should always be interpreted in light of the 
specifi c time of application. The rationale of this thought is that changing times breed 
changing violations of the Constitution, a problem that can only be addressed by an ever-
adapting practice. Modern judicial review is thus joined by a broad interpretation of the 
Constitution, originating in some higher principles. These principles may even be values 
outside the written text of the Constitution.15 Also, in modern judicial review, standing is 
usually broadened.16
In this framework, a polarization of two conceptions of the role of a body conducting 
constitutional interpretation may be traced. Traditional judicial review may be characterized 
by judicial self-restraint, while modern judicial review may be characterized by judicial 
activism.17 Under this approach, the difference between self-restraint and activism is not 
only in degree, but in quality, because they represent two radically different conceptions of 
power.
The positioning of transitional judicial review in this framework, however, remains 
uncertain. Wolfe argues that traditional review is characterized by a conscious abstaining 
from striking down laws, while the modern era is represented by judicial legislation: 
“Judicial activism, in this framework, is the exercise of ‘legislativeʼ power by courts in 
constitutional cases.”18 Meanwhile, the transitional era seems to be a mixture of the two 
others: On the one hand, the notion that judges should refrain from “legislation” was still 
vivid – and was often emphasized in opinions of the Court in the fi rst decades of the 20th 
century –; on the other hand, fi ndings of unconstitutionality sometimes signifi cantly 
hampered legislative efforts and “social experiments”. In other words, the Supreme Court 
did not assume a legislative role in any way, but it already became a hindrance to it.19
the written law; on the other hand, this inclusion into a written text implies its insuffi ciency, the 
possibility of legal gaps, which may require the utilization of sources beyond the Constitution. Some 
scholars claim that this reliance on extra-constitutional sources was already involved in the original 
conception of the framers. Others question this conviction. Sherry (1987) 1127–1177; Michael (1991) 
421–490.
15  For example, Justice Brennan, in his concurring opinion in Furman v Georgia, a case dealing 
with the constitutionality of capital punishment, argues that the guiding principle in interpreting the 
Eighth Amendment (forbidding “cruel and unusual punishments”) is human dignity, a value not 
explicitly named in the Constitution of the United States. Brennan argues that four further principles 
can be deduced from human dignity with respect to the Eighth Amendment. 1. Infl icting punishment, 
however lenient, for certain conditions (e.g. being sick) in itself violates human dignity. 2. Severe 
punishments must not be infl icted arbitrarily. 3. A severe punishment must not be unacceptable to 
contemporary society. 4. A severe punishment must not be excessive. 408 US 270–282 (1972).
16  The problems of standing shall be further elucidated in 3.3.3., in connection with Roe v 
Wade.
17  Wolfe (1997) 30.
18  Wolfe (1997) 30.
19  Wolfe somehow seems to refl ect an oft-repeated premise that the Supreme Court 
systematically and consequently struck down acts of legislatures, even though statistics do not buttress 
such conclusions. For such a survey already from 1913, see Warren (1913) 294–313; for later analyses 
pointing out that the Supreme Court was in fact driven by a consequent notion of equality rather than 
a pure (or ruthless) laissez-faire ideology, see generally Gillman (1993).
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3.2. Five approaches to activism in Kmiec’s typology
Rather than offering a defi nition of his own, Keenan D. Kmiec distinguished fi ve current 
conceptions of judicial activism. In this chapter, I am going to introduce these approaches 
with a minimal correction, and some of their fl aws.20
3.2.1. Decision instead of other branches
The two approaches introduced in this section were treated separately by Kmiec, however, I 
think they should be treated as the two aspects of a same phenomenon: that one way or 
another, an activist court restricts the discretion of other branches of power: in one case, 
this restriction is negative (that is, declaring a legislative act unconstitutional), in the other, 
the substitution of a lacking decision takes place.
3.2.1.1. Striking down arguably constitutional actions of other branches
Activism is deemed problematic because of its inherent confl ict with the majority principle, 
a problem referred to since Bickel as the “counter-majoritarian diffi culty”.21 In fact, the 
problem becomes most visible in the relationship between courts and legislatures, and I am 
going to focus on this aspect, even though Kmiec includes the executive branch as well.22
Activism is not to be mistaken for the striking down of obviously unconstitutional 
actions. In an article, Frank Easterbrook treats activism and all types of striking down as the 
same (though perhaps he did not lack a certain irony),23 when he, after examining a sample 
of fi fty years, concludes that courts of both types (that is, either conservative or liberal) are 
activist to the same degree.24 However, I agree with Kmiec that such an approach to 
activism is not very revealing.25 On the one hand, striking down the assailed act in certain 
cases is quite natural by a body dealing with constitutional adjudication; on the other hand, 
there may be cases when an action is obviously in violation of the plain text of the 
Constitution (e.g. an act legalizing slavery). “Easy” and “hard” cases thus need to be taken 
into consideration.
Problems still do ensue. In Buck v Bell, the Court decided about the constitutionality of 
forced sterilization of imbeciles in Virginia. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the 
Court which was accepted with only one dissent.26 Holmes argued that if the strong can be 
called to sacrifi ce their life for the community, a lesser sacrifi ce may properly be expected 
from its weaker members: “We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call 
upon the best citizens for their lives. It would be strange if it could not call upon those who 
already sap the strength of the State for these lesser sacrifi ces, often not felt to be such by 
those concerned, in order to prevent our being swamped with incompetence.”27 Later he 
writes one of the most condemned sentences in American constitutional history: “Three 
20  Kmiec (2004) 1463–1476.
21  Bickel (1986) 16–23.
22  Constitutional review may concern orders of the executive branch as well, as exemplifi ed by 
Myers v United States, 272 US 52 (1926), the central question of which was whether the President has 
the power to dismiss executive offi cers without the agreement of a legislative body.
23  Easterbrook (2002) 1407.
24  Easterbrook (2002) 1409–1410.
25  Kmiec (2004) 1464.
26  This sole dissenter was Justice Butler, whose avowed Catholicism in fact made his choice 
predictable for his colleagues. See Leuchtenburg (1995) 14.
27  274 US 207 (1927).
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generations of imbeciles are enough.”28 This latter utterance is especially revealing, because 
it seems to refl ect a devotion to the spirit of the legislative action in question. Nowadays, 
Holmes’ Social Darwinism is a well-known fact to anybody researching American 
constitutional law, and it seems quite plausible to detect his identifi cation with the act in 
question beyond his famous (yet sometimes debated29) passivism. Several decades later, 
critics of the “conservative Court” also argued that the Court is more lenient towards acts in 
accordance with conservative or republican values.
A special case that may be treated here is the opposition of the court to an act that 
expresses historical traditions. Planned Parenthood v Casey30 and Lawrence v Texas31 both 
dealt with highly divisive issues – the former with abortion, the latter with the criminalization 
of consensual sexual relationships between consenting adults. Casey introduced the standard 
of “undue burden” to the regulation of abortion, thus digressing from Roe v Wade’s32 
trimester system. Lawrence overruled Bowers v Hardwick,33 declaring the sanctioning of 
consensual homosexual relationships unconstitutional on privacy grounds.
In Casey, Justice Scalia dissented, arguing that the restriction of abortion is in 
accordance with the traditions of the American people.34 This argument was brought up in 
the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Rehnquist as well.35 Here, the case is clear: Justice 
Scalia and the Chief Justice implicitly found it activistic for a court to oppose traditions.
In Lawrence v Texas, however, the role of traditions seems dubious. Speaking for the 
Court, Justice Kennedy stated that “[i]n our tradition the State is not omnipresent in the 
home”.36 Later he wrote that “it should be noted that there is no longstanding history in this 
country of laws directed at homosexual conduct as a distinct matter”.37 What he said, in 
other words, is that the criminalization of homosexuality cannot be grounded by tradition. 
He also argued that such regulations were not enforced against adults conducting consensual 
homosexual acts at home.38 The importance of tradition in this argument may be sensed 
from the criticism of the abortion decisions: “Roe and Casey, of course, subjected the 
28  274 US 207 (1927).
29  Phillips (1999) 439–477.
30  505 US 833 (1992).
31  539 US 558 (2003).
32  410 US 113 (1973).
33  478 US 186 (1986).
34  505 US 980. Scalia also argued that as the Constitution does not expressly require the States 
to allow abortion, its restriction cannot be judged unconstitutional. His argumentation is reminiscent 
of Holmes. In Scalia’s words, “[a] State’s choice between two positions on which reasonable people 
can disagree is constitutional even when (as is often the case) it intrudes upon a ‘libertyʼ in the 
absolute sense.” 505 US 980. In his dissent to Lochner v New York, Justice Holmes wrote: “A 
reasonable man might think it a proper measure on the score of health. Men whom I certainly could 
not pronounce unreasonable would uphold it as a fi rst instalment of a general regulation of the hours 
of work.” 198 US 76. Thus, both of them argue in fact that if an explicit constitutional prohibition in 
a certain question is lacking, and a reasonable person may fi nd the respective regulation defendable, it 
cannot be deemed unconstitutional.
35  “Nor do the historical traditions of the American people support the view that the right to 
terminate one’s pregnancy is ‘fundamental.ʼ” 505 US 952.
36  539 US 562.
37  539 US 568.
38  539 US 569.
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restriction of abortion to heightened scrutiny without even attempting to establish that the 
freedom to abort was rooted in this Nation’s tradition.”39
In his dissent, Justice Scalia argued that in spite of Justice Kennedy’s allegations, 
regulations against homosexual acts were enforced by authorities.40 He also criticized the 
usage of the term “emerging awareness”, condemning it because it “is by defi nition not 
‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition[s],ʼ as we have said ‘fundamental rightʼ 
status requires.”41 What should be noted here is that a reliance on traditions may be illusory, 
because the identifi cation of “tradition” also faces serious hardships.
3.2.1.2. Judicial legislation
In certain respects, judicial legislation is the opposite of striking down arguably 
constitutional actions of other branches: in this case, the judiciary, instead of placing a 
provision out of the effective legal system, inserts one into it.
The emergence of judicial legislation can be anticipated mostly in case of legal gaps, 
that is, in situations when the applicable legal regulation does not provide a clear answer. 
Constitutional law often faces such problems, because constitutional texts ought to be 
fl exible. As Chief Justice Marshall declared in McCulloch v Maryland, “[a] constitution, to 
contain an accurate detail of all the subdivisions of which its great powers will admit, and 
of all the means by which they may be carried into execution, would partake of the prolixity 
of a legal code, and could scarcely be embraced by the human mind. It would probably 
never be understood by the public. Its nature, therefore, requires, that only its great outlines 
should be marked, its important objects designated, and the minor ingredients which 
compose those objects be deduced from the nature of the objects themselves.”42 Ambiguity 
in meaning is inevitable. Of course, this makes “judicial legislation” inevitable as well, but 
its extent may be debated.
Miranda v Arizona is an illustrative example.43 The Supreme Court settled some basic 
guidelines concerning the interrogation of a person in custody, the most important of which 
is that he or she has to be clearly informed about the right to remain silent, that anything he 
or she says will be used against him in court, about the right to consult with a lawyer and to 
have the lawyer with him during interrogation, and about the possibility of appointing a 
public defender to represent him. This decision is a typical example of the case when the 
judiciary prescribes positive duties to the legislator.44 Chief Justice Warren, speaking for the 
Court, detailed the circumstances of custody and interrogation that wield an undue infl uence 
on the suspect even in the absence of physical abuse,45 and he argued that these led to the 
violation of the Fifth Amendment’s protection from self-incrimination. Later studies, 
however, seriously criticized the effectiveness of the Miranda doctrine. For instance, 
Cassell points out – citing Sam Gross – that “before Miranda, the typical way in which a 
39  539 US 588.
40  539 US 598.
41  539 US 598.
42  17 US 407.
43  384 US 436 (1966)
44  One may add, however, that some more extreme forms of judicial legislation also did occur. 
Cox describes a case when the proceeding court enumerated specifi c criteria of constitutionality in 
connection with the accommodation of asylum patients, like the suffi cient amount of warm water or 
the adequate proportion of patients and nurses. Cox (1976) 96–98.
45  384 US 445–458.
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miscarriage was discovered was that ‘the actual criminal was arrested on an unrelated 
charge and, after being held in custody for a day or two, she confessed to the perpetration of 
all the crimes charged to the misidentifi ed suspect.ʼ Since that time, Gross concludes, such 
exonerations through true confessions appear to have declined signifi cantly, with Miranda 
being a possible cause.”46 Judge Posner criticized the broad constitutional interpretation of 
the Supreme Court concerning defendant rights, stating that “a great upsurge in crime rates 
accompanied the ‘Warren court’sʼ adventurous rulings in criminal procedure, although the 
causality is deeply uncertain, there is some evidence that these rulings did cause crime rates 
to rise.”47 This example aptly shows how “extra rules” derived from the Constitution may 
restrict legislative action in a debatable way.
3.2.2. Ignoring precedent
The importance of precedents is derived from considerations of justice and legal certainty, 
identifi ed by Schauer as the requirements of fairness and predictability.48 Besides, Schauer 
emphasizes the effectiveness provided by precedents as later decision makers can rely on 
the arguments of earlier decisions, and the coherence resulting from following precedents 
may raise the dignity of the respective body.49 A digression from a deeply established 
precedent therefore may cause great stirring among lay and professional audiences alike.
Kmiec introduces this approach by sketching two relationships, namely that of 
“horizontal versus vertical”, and “constitutional versus statutory versus common law” 
precedents.50 This separation need not be addressed here, as my concern is solely with the 
relationship between constitutional precedents.
The relationship between Plessy v Ferguson51 and Brown v Board of Education52 is an 
illuminating instance of activism as ignoring precedent, which, however, also raises a 
problem immediately. As is well known, Plessy held racial segregation in public transport 
constitutional, in so far as the quality of the service is equal. This principle was fi rst set 
aside by Brown, in connection with a discriminating school regulation in Topeka, Kansas.53 
For this reason, Brown is often regarded as activist, though mostly a “good” one.54 This 
activist decision became a precedent, but on the basis of the current defi nition, a digression 
from it may inevitably count as activism, even if it is aimed to restrict the scope of judicial 
review practiced by the Supreme Court on the basis of constitutionally arguable reasons. 
For such reasons, this defi nition of activism is extremely malleable and relative.
3.2.3. Departures from accepted interpretive methodology
A great impetus for the systematic analysis of legal interpretation was Savigny’s separation 
of four classic methods of interpretation, while in the 20th century, an important contribution 
46  Cassell (1999) 532.
47  Posner (1995) 74.
48  Schauer (1987) 595–598.
49  Schauer (1987) 599–601.
50  Kmiec (2004) 1466–1471.
51  163 US 537 (1896).
52  347 US 483 (1954).
53  In this context, Brown is usually paired with Plessy, however, Plessy was not explicitly 
overruled by Brown, and the decision invalidating public transport segregation specifi cally was 
Boynton v Virginia, 364 US 454 (1960).
54  Swygert (1982) 456–457.
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was provided by the Bielefeld Circle that distinguished eleven interpretive methods in 
Western countries.55 It is now obvious that legal interpretation is not something conducted 
according to uniform and indisputable rules. This state of affairs entails two problems. 
Firstly, choosing from different methods of interpretation is a matter of legal philosophical 
premises, and the legal thought of a given country infl uences its practice of legal 
interpretation as well. But such preferences are not constant in the long run. For example, in 
the fi rst decades of the 20th century, natural law premises affecting the constitutional 
adjudication of the Supreme Court were replaced by a more pragmatic-self-restrained 
approach. Disregarding these considerations would result in labeling West Coast Hotel v 
Parrish56 an activist decision – an unusual conclusion, to say the least. Later, the rise of 
originalism called attention to the “original intent” of the framers (whatever way one may 
identify this) – once again disfavoring broad interpretation. Digressions on behalf of a more 
restrictive interpretive method may thus, this way, be seen as activist decisions.
Second, as Kmiec also mentions, no real or reassuring professional consensus exists 
regarding proper methods of legal interpretation.57 Of course, this is basically true, but I 
think it should be corrected in two aspects. On the one hand, this is mostly true of the 
United States, where the community of legal professionals shows an unparalleled variety in 
social background, schooling, and other relevant characteristics, which is perceptible in the 
variety of interpretive approaches as well. On the other hand, despite this variety, the main 
judicial body of the United States follows a more or less coherent practice which is mostly 
followed by lesser courts, too. The duty of adhering to precedent helps to ensure a relative 
certainty amidst the manifoldness.
3.2.4. Result-oriented judging
Kmiec considers this attempt at defi nition the most suitable one.58 Indeed, it helps to bridge 
the diffi culties ensuing from connecting activism to striking down certain actions. The 
specifi c result that the judge presumably aspires to reach may be achieved either by striking 
down or by upholding the respective action. The emphasis is on the intent of the judge, 
instead of the outward result. This aspect, however, makes the approach speculative, too, as 
we are in effect forced to make presumptions on the content of the judge’s mind.
3.3. Dimensions of judicial activism according to Lindquist and Cross
In 2009, Stefanie A. Lindquist and Frank B. Cross published their research measuring 
judicial activism statistically. Its fi rst chapter deals with the possible approaches to activism. 
Here, the authors do not write about its defi nitions, rather, they enumerate its four 
dimensions.
3.3.1. Majoritarianism and deference to other governmental actors
This dimension, focusing on the counter-majoritarian diffi culty, can be identifi ed with 
Kmiec’s “striking down” defi nition. The authors consider this dimension unfi t for empirical 
analysis, because it implies hardly identifi able poles, namely those of judicial “minimalism” 
55  Summers et al. (1991) 464–465.
56  300 US 379 (1937)
57  Kmiec (2004) 1474.
58  Kmiec (2004) 1476.
Ajur2.indb   222 2015.09.25.   13:30:25
223DOGMATIC AND SOCIAL SCIENTIFIC ACTIVISM IN THE LOCHNER ERA
and “maximalism”.59 The former means an effort to digress from accepted doctrines as little 
as possible, introducing a gradual change where necessary. In the latter case, the judge does 
not refrain from radical changes.
3.3.2. Interpretive stability and fi delity
This aspect seems to refer to the degree of adhering to authoritative texts in general,60 
therefore it is broader than Kmiec’s “ignoring precedent”. In my view, this label is more 
fi tting, because it involves more types of objectifi ed grounds of legal interpretation, like the 
text itself, precedents, or documented legislative history. Perhaps legislative intent may be 
partially deemed an exception, as this intent may be identifi ed in the subjective (and 
hypothesized) intent of the framers, too. This partial exception, however, does not discredit 
the overall picture. Also, it needs to be mentioned that in most cases the enumerated 
instruments serve to interpret the text of a legal regulation.
3.3.3. Institutional aggrandizement
According to Cross and Lindquist, institutional aggrandizement takes place when a court 
examines questions it excluded from judicial scrutiny in earlier instances for certain 
reasons.61 This approach is new to the aforementioned ones, and is of specifi c interest.
One way of extending the range of examinable questions is the reinterpretation of the 
Court’s self-imposed restrictions. In Baker v Carr,62 referred to by the authors, the 
petitioners argued that the state of Tennessee reapportioned the seats of the General 
Assembly among the 95 counties in a disproportionate way, and thus they suffered a 
“debasement of their votes”. The Court struck down this rule on the ground of the Equal 
Protection Clause. By taking this step, the Court abandoned its “political questions” 
doctrine, which was maintained in Colegrove v Green,63 a judgment cited by the 
representatives of the State, and in which the examination of a similar question was 
dismissed on the grounds of political questions.64 The Court disregarded this precedent,65 
arguing that “the mere fact that the suit seeks protection of a political right does not mean it 
presents a political question”.66
59  Lindquist et al. (2009) 35–36.
60  Lindquist et al. (2009) 36–37.
61  Lindquist et al. (2009) 37.
62  369 US 186 (1962).
63  328 US 549 (1946).
64  328 US 554–556.
65  Lindquist and Cross mistakenly write that in Baker v Carr, the Court overruled Colegrove v 
Green. Lindquist and Cross (2009) 37. But although Colegrove naturally fell out of practice, its 
inapplicability was not “offi cially” declared by the Supreme Court, and the decision was simply 
ignored.
66  369 US 209. Speaking for the Court, Justice Brennan referred to a number of precedents in 
which the Court dealt with similar issues on the merits, political questions notwithstanding. These, 
however, are all per curiam decisions, mostly unanimous ones, with only a couple of sentences 
serving as reasoning. There are only two exceptions. The opinion in South v Peters, 339 US 276 
(1950), is about one page long, however, it does not deal in any way with the degree to which courts 
may examine issues of franchise on the merits. In MacDougall v Green, 335 US 281 (1948), it seems 
clear that the petition is dismissed, even though the Court dwells for about two and a half pages on the 
considerations that make the regulation in question reasonable. It may be mentioned that these two 
latter decisions are not unanimous, this fact, however, has no bearing on what has been written so far.
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In Baker v Carr, the Court broadened its authority to deal with questions previously 
excluded from scrutiny. But the broadening of authority has occurred in other ways too. In 
Roe v Wade, the Court decided the issue on the merits, even though, in Epstein’s opinion, 
the case of the female petitioner was a typical case of mootness, as she already gave birth to 
her child. According to Justice Blackmun, who delivered the opinion of the Court, declaring 
the case moot would lead to an absurd result, for “the normal 266-day human gestation 
period is so short that the pregnancy will come to term before the usual appellate process is 
complete”.67 Of course, there are serious considerations in favor of this viewpoint, because 
an opposite decision would inevitably exclude certain persons from the possibility of 
initiating constitutional review. However, a more serious dilemma arises: the legal 
involvement of Norma McCorvey was questionable, as the assailed regulation ordered the 
punishment only of persons who assisted a woman in an abortion. In a strict sense, only 
persons performing abortion on a woman could have been affected by the Texas statute.68
3.3.4. Result-oriented judging
While Kmiec considered this defi nition as the most suitable one, Cross and Lindquist said 
that it only provides ground for political accusations of activism, and thus leads to the 
blurring of the concept, because no consequence can be drawn from it, except regarding the 
political-ideological alignment of the critic.69
4. DOGMATIC AND SCIENTIFIC ACTIVISM AND PASSIVISM: 
ONE POSSIBLE TYPOLOGY
What can be told of the enumerated defi nitional attempts is that they can be classifi ed as 
focusing either on the outward result of the court’s conduct (“externally oriented 
approaches”), or the judge’s inner motives (“internally oriented approaches”). Most possible 
defi nitions are externally oriented, as is the case with “decision instead of other branches”, 
“ignoring precedent (or other authoritative texts)”, “institutional aggrandizement”, or 
Wolfe’s “modern judicial review”, while “result-oriented judging” is internally oriented. Of 
course, these possible approaches in themselves cannot grasp the complexity of judicial 
activism. Both focal points bear importance in such an attempt, albeit in a different way. 
Externally oriented approaches emphasize objective, perceptible features that appear as a 
result of activist judicial conduct. This is inevitable if one wishes to set up a defi nitional 
framework. Internally oriented approaches aim at tracing the specifi c intent of the judge, 
which is also important in identifying seemingly non-activist conduct (like declining to 
strike down an act from ideological reasons, as described in 3.2.1.1.); however, such inner 
motives are by the nature of things very hard to prove. For this reason, I am inclined to 
agree with Lindquist and Cross in that accusations of activism on this ground refl ect only 
the ideological standpoint of the accuser.
In my view, judicial activism can be best defi ned as a systematic judicial invalidation 
of acts of other branches (most commonly those of the legislature), which is buttressed by a 
reasoning applying a broad interpretation of the respective constitution. The focus is thus 
67  410 US 125. For Epstein’s critique see Epstein (1973) 162.
68  It deserves mentioning that there was indeed such a petitioner in the case. Of course, the 
story of Norma McCorvey, subjected to a series of hardships in her life, is much more memorable for 
the public. E.g. Hitchcock (2007).
69  Lindquist et al. (2009) 39.
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twofold: fi rstly, it is placed on the pure result (invalidation), secondly, on the legal reasons 
that led to this result. Thus one may avoid the fallacies that can ensue from restricting 
analysis to only one external circumstance (like identifying activism solely with 
invalidations, without regard to the clearness of the constitutional text), and view the 
problem in a more refi ned way. It must be mentioned that by this defi nition, I omit the 
instances when a court is self-restraining due to ideological reasons. This is not because I 
deny such a possibility, rather, because I consider activism as a judicial conduct that 
positively seeks to overstep the judicial role understood solely as the applier of law. A self-
restraining judge, though perhaps acting from ideological reasons, does not overstep these 
limits.
I think activism can be categorized further on the basis of the reasoning of activist 
decisions. Decisions of the Supreme Court (or any body dealing with constitutional 
adjudication, for that matter) sometimes refer to scientifi c works of one kind or another. 
This ensues from the nature of things: constitutional adjudication – not unlike regular 
adjudication – concerns all areas of life. Although a court reviewing the constitutionality of 
an act does not have – indeed, it is forbidden – to examine the facts of the case before it, it 
cannot avoid other factual issues: it has to be informed of the general facts of the situation 
which concern the case. Regular courts do not necessarily face this problem, because legal 
rules tend to be more or less specifi c, thus providing more restrictive guidelines. 
Constitutional provisions are, however, abstract, and require concretization, which ought to 
be done with regard to the relevant facts of the issue at hand. Taking just a fl eeting glance at 
some cases cited above, one can see a wide variety of problems arising: racial segregation 
and schooling, abortion, reproductive rights, and the situation of the fetus, economic 
regulation, same-sex relationships and their (presumed or real) effect on society’s morals. 
All these fi elds are addressed in detail by representatives of different systems of knowledge: 
sociologists, medics, economists. The judge whose work is to concretize constitutional 
norms is advised to consult these fi elds of science in order to be able to compare such 
norms with the reality they are intended to regulate.
Thus, the typology I wish to introduce here is based on the presence of such references 
to scientifi c treatises. I understand “scientifi c treatises” to mean mostly analyses in the 
social sciences, because many constitutional cases (especially the ones that stir harsh 
debates) are connected with questions related to these fi elds, but natural sciences are not 
excluded. The issues enumerated in the previous paragraph show a connection with both 
fi elds.
“Dogmatic activist” decisions contain arguments of a speculative nature. This means 
that beside striking down the assailed provision and applying a broad interpretation, they 
state facts in an a priori way, by relying on “common sense”, “obvious” or “well-known” 
circumstances. Such facts or circumstances are the presupposition of the material equality 
of contracting parties in connection with freedom of contract (that is, beside formal equality, 
parties are presumed to be conscious and rational actors, who are able to estimate the 
consequences of their decisions, to protect their own interests, and to choose the alternative 
that is the best for them), or to the contrary, the presupposition that one party will misuse 
his or her advantageous position during the making of a contract. On the other hand, 
“dogmatic passivist” decisions, besides upholding the respective provision based upon a 
narrow interpretation, use similar speculative statements of facts.
On the other hand, “scientifi c activist” decisions explicitly refer to scientifi c data to 
buttress a broad interpretation aimed at striking down a provision. “Scientifi c passivist” 
decisions also apply such express references, but this is used to uphold the respective rule.
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As written above, it is irrelevant whether the cited work belongs to social or natural 
sciences. It must be added that such an argumentation does not need to be unobjectionable 
from a scientifi c standpoint. In this context, the crucial feature is not that the judge declares 
the indubitable truth in a question outside jurisprudence, but that he or she involves such 
external viewpoints to make his or her opinion more convincing.
The question may arise as to where references to jurisprudential works would belong. 
In my opinion, the emphasis here is that the reference is made to a work that is external to 
jurisprudence. Therefore, if an opinion contains reference only to jurisprudential works, it is 
still to be considered “dogmatic”.
5. THE APPLICATION OF THE SCHEME TO THE “LAISSEZ-FAIRE COURT”
Taking a look at the tendencies of the Supreme Court’s constitutional adjudication in the 
fi rst decades of the 20th century, it seems quite clear that in proportion, the Court turned 
down far less market regulating acts than it actually upheld. Also, it seems that the Court 
was following a consequential (though perhaps outdated) mode of interpretation.70 Turning 
to the reasoning of such decisions, the following tendencies deserve emphasis.
There were certain issues that could obviously be subject to regulation in the opinion 
of the Court. Such issues were the restriction of the trade of certain harmful wares (mostly 
“spirituous and intoxicating liquors”), the regulation of the quality of food, or later, the 
quality of roads. Decisions concerning these matters regularly show a pattern of upholding 
the impugned law. For instance, in Clark Distilling Co. v Western Maryland Railway Co. 
and State of West Virginia, Chief Justice White declared the following: “That government 
can, consistently with the due process clause, forbid the manufacture and sale of liquor and 
regulate its traffi c, is not open to controversy; and that there goes along with this power full 
police authority to make it effective, is also not open.”71 Similarly, in Mangano Co. v 
Hamilton, Justice Sutherland stated that “[i]n respect of the equal protection clause it is 
obvious that the differences between butter and oleomargarine are suffi cient to justify their 
separate classifi cation for purposes of taxation”.72 Such forceful language indicates that the 
Court considered certain issues as belonging to a broad legislative discretion due to their 
importance.
The Court often expressed its view that the evaluation of the wisdom of the legislative 
act before it is beyond its competence and authority, and this statement constituted an 
important part of its reasoning. Two examples that corroborate this statement are Gant v 
Oklahoma City and Pacifi c States Box & Basket Co. v White. In the former, Justice 
Sutherland emphasized that “[w]hether the judgment of the common council of the city in 
the present case was wise, or whether the requirement will produce hardship in particular 
instances, are matters with which this court has nothing to do”.73 In the latter – the opinion 
of the Court delivered by Justice Brandeis – it is declared that „[w]ith the wisdom of such a 
regulation we have, of course, no concern”.74 These and other similar utterances demonstrate 
that the Court was heedful of emphasizing that it acknowledged and respected the 
boundaries set by the separation of powers.
70  These statements seem corroborated by Warren (1913) and Gillman (1993).
71  242 US 320 (1917).
72  292 US 43 (1934).
73  289 US 102 (1933).
74  296 US 182 (1935).
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The Court frequently relied on precedents in its opinions, which is not so surprising in 
itself, however, it deserves mentioning that sometimes this reliance seems to fulfi ll the 
specifi c purpose of giving a greater weight to the reasoning, and making the conclusion 
seem necessary and inevitable. Nebbia v New York75 spectacularly illustrates this point: the 
majority opinion (delivered by Justice Roberts) and the dissent both enumerate precedential 
authorities to support their conclusion, and the debate between them focuses on the proper 
interpretation of the cited decisions.
The Court regularly expressed its abstinence from deeming “scientifi c precision” a 
condition of constitutionality. For instance, in Ohio Oil Co. v Conway, it expressed the view 
that “[i]n levying such taxes [i.e. a severance tax on crude petroleum at specifi c rates per 
barrel] the State is not required to resort to close distinctions or to maintain a precise, 
scientifi c uniformity with reference to composition, use or value”.76 A similar utterance can 
be found in Sproles v Binford: “To make scientifi c precision a criterion of constitutional 
power would be to subject the State to an intolerable supervision hostile to the basic 
principles of our Government and wholly beyond the protection which the general clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to secure.”77 Such instruments of argumentation 
also led to underpin a passivist attitude.
It seems that the Court considered it its duty to fi nd a constitutional interpretation to 
the acts before it, and to uphold it if there is such an alternative. Such a conviction is 
manifest in Plymouth Coal Co. v Pennsylvania: “it is a general and fundamental rule that if 
a statute be reasonably susceptible of two interpretations, one of which would render it 
unconstitutional and the other valid, it is the duty of the courts to adopt that construction 
which will uphold its validity; there being a strong presumption that the law-making body 
has intended to act within, and not in excess of, its constitutional authority”.78 It may be 
remarked that sometimes the Court made exceptions to this practice, for instance, in Yick 
Wo v Hopkins,79 a frequently cited case, the assailed municipal ordinance was struck down, 
because, although it contained neutral regulations, it conferred an arbitrary power to 
authorities, which indeed abused it. Nevertheless, the Court’s efforts to discover a 
constitutional interpretation whenever possible are traceable throughout its early 20th 
century practice.
The Court was prone to take local conditions into consideration, and this inclination 
also led to the upholding of the assailed act. This is the case with Advance-Rumely Thresher 
Co. v Jackson, in which the Court upheld the statute before it with regard to the specifi c 
circumstances in the respective state.80
The Court was naturally also inclined to accept beliefs or convictions pertaining to 
social roles. In no decision is this inclination more manifest than Muller v Oregon, in which 
Justice Brewer, who delivered the opinion of the Court, wrote that “woman’s physical 
structure and the performance of maternal functions place her at a disadvantage in the 
struggle for subsistence is obvious”.81 It should be added that Brewer also took Brandeis’ 
long amicus curiae brief into consideration, but it seems clear that even without the 
75  291 US 502 (1934).
76  281 US 159 (1930).
77  286 US 388 (1932).
78  232 US 546 (1914).
79  118 US 356 (1886).
80  287 US 289–290 (1932).
81  208 US 421 (1908).
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argumentation included in that document, the then widespread belief concerning women’s 
social role quite palpably anticipated a similar utterance and result.
What has been written can be summarized as follows. The patterns of argumentation 
detectable in the practice of the Court in the fi rst decades of the 20th century show that it 
mostly applied a dogmatic passivist mode of reasoning. The opinions obviously contained 
constitutional legal reasoning, and besides that, there are certain presumptions that also 
infl uenced the outcome. Scientifi c argumentation was rare, and it seems that it appeared 
mostly in Brandeis’ opinions.82 Also, certain single decisions show traits of dogmatic 
activism, like Lochner v New York.83 Aside from these, however, it seems that the 
argumentative style of the Supreme Court can mostly be described as dogmatic passivist.
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